A sport and exercise psychology perspective on stress. by Gill, Diane L. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
A Sport and Exercise Psychology: Perspective on Stress 
 
By: Diane L. Gill 
 
Gill, D.L. (1994). A sport and exercise psychology perspective on stress. Quest, 46, 20-27. 
 
Made available courtesy of Human Kinetics: 
http://hk.humankinetics.com/quest/journalAbout.cfm?CFID=12915865&CFTOKEN=86903051 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
 
My purpose is to introduce the psychological perspective (or perspectives) on stress. In doing so, I will focus on 
conceptual models or frameworks that guide sport and exercise psychology work on stress, leaving the details 
of the research findings and implications to the later papers (Berger, 1994; Dishman, 1994; Wrisberg, 1994). 
Rather than detailed research, this paper presents a framework or context for those subsequent papers. 
 
To the sport and exercise psychologist, stress is neither an event (stressor), a physiological response, nor a 
stressor—response chain. All those concepts miss the key psychological component- -the individual, and more 
specifically, the individual's perceptions and cognitions. Stress is what you think it is. Thought, or cognition, is 
the key element differentiating a psychological approach from some others. 
 
The following illustration from Spielberger's (1989) work captures the key aspects of most psychological 
models: 
 
Stressor  Perception and Appraisal of Threat State Anxiety 
 
First, there is the stressor (e.g., competition, heat, fatigue). Then comes perceived threat, or the appraisal 
process. Without this perception ("I think I'm stressed") there is no stressor. This appraisal is neither automatic 
nor as simple as it appears, but this perceived threat is what elicits the stress response. State anxiety is the 
response Spielberger highlights and is the response studied most by sport and exercise psychologists. 
 
Appraisal is also the key element in Lazarus's stress model (e.g., Lazarus, 1990, 1993; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984), and that model is the focus of this paper. But Lazarus's model and most current approaches are more 
complex and go beyond simply highlighting cognition. According to Lazarus (1990), stress is not definable, 
because stress is not one construct but a rubric or complex system of interrelated constructs and processes. 
 
Lazarus's model serves as my guiding framework—not because it has guided the sport and exercise psychology 
work on stress, but because it seems to be a framework that both ties that work together and can be used to 
develop further research directions and practical implications. After a brief overview of some of the key aspects 
of Lazarus's model for reference, I will review the major lines of research related to stress within sport and 
exercise psychology (particularly noting how they move toward the more complex Lazarus model), eventually 
returning to Lazarus's model to pull things together and suggest directions. 
 
Overview of Lazarus's Model 
In his early major writing on stress, Lazarus (1966) emphasized cognitive appraisal. He not only has maintained 
that cognitive emphasis but also has expanded the model greatly in his more recent work. The following 
highlights key aspects of that model by listing the major themes presented by Lazarus (1986) in one overview of 
his model. 
 
1. Stress is best regarded as a rubric or system of interdependent variables. Stress is a complex system or 
process rather than a unidimensional variable. One cannot define stress as any one part of that system. 
2. The stress process refers to a relationship between a person with certain characteristics and an environment 
with certain characteristics. Appraisal is the key here. The person's appraisal, which includes appraisal of 
coping capabilities, defines the relationship; the person and environment affect each other. The relationship 
is more than the sum of its pans; it cannot be decomposed into person and environmental antecedents. The 
level of analysis should be the relationship stress is not in the person or in the  
environment, but in the relationship. Lazarus's model is sometimes called transactional, reflecting this 
emphasis on the relationship. 
3. The system is recursive in that each variable and process can affect the other, depending on where in the 
flow of behavior one begins. We do not have one independent variable and one dependent variable—all can 
be both. 
4. Emotion and stress are overlapping constructs. Also, emotion is more encompassing and informative. From 
his early work (e.g., Lazarus, 1966) to the present (e.g., Lazarus, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1990), Lazarus has 
been moving toward an emphasis on emotion, but this aspect of his work has not yet been adapted fully by 
sport psychologists. According to Lazarus, studying the intensities, qualities, antecedents, and processes of 
emotions will give more information on what is important to people and on how they think than will 
continuing to focus on unidimensional stressors. 
5. Stress and emotion are best understood as processes rather than static events. The stress process changes over 
time. Multiple variables do not a system make. The space between antecedents and consequences is the heart 
of the process, and we must look at how variables change. All the complex LISREL and path analyses that 
we can calculate will not tell us about process until we actually assess process and change. 
6. Not all stressful encounters, severity notwithstanding, have the same significance for mental and physical 
health. Some events or hassles are more equal than others. Lazarus made this point in particular reference to 
work on general life stressors and health, but it also seems relevant to other sport and exercise concems (e.g., 
performance, enjoyment). Some events are more central to the person than others. Just summing events 




Lazarus's model did not guide sport and exercise psychology research on stress, but an historical review of our 
work reveals parallel developments. The story of stress in sport and exercise psychology begins with simpler 
models. As sport and exercise psychology was becoming a specialty area in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, 
stress was one of the initial focal points. Selye's (1974, 1976) work had infiltrated psychology, and several 
psychologists (e.g., Lazarus, 1966; McGrath, 1970; Spielberger, 1966) were actively researching stress and 
developing conceptual models. McGrath's and Spielberger's work was current and was a strong influence on 
sport psychologists such as Rainer Martens and Dan Landers, who conducted several important studies during 
this time. 
 
Jones and Hardy (1990) illustrated the major research directions on stress and sport in a triad comprising stress 
responses, stress and performance, and stress management/selfregulation. Stress and performance is clearly the 
most active of the three and is the one with the longest history. Jones and Hardy discuss stress responses as 
anxiety responses to sport and competition, but more recently, sport and exercise psychologists have explored 
stress responses in relation to health and fitness, as covered in later papers in this issue (Berger, 1994; Dishman, 
1994; Plowman, 1994). Stress management emerged from the stress-performance literature, along with the 
increasing emphasis on applied sport psychology work, over the last 10 years. 
 
The following review of our sport and exercise psychology research focuses on the models that have guided that 
work, as they have advanced and moved closer to the Lazarus model. 
 
Anxiety—Performance Research 
Details on findings and implications of anxiety–performance research may be found in Gould and Krane's 
(1992) recent review or Wrisberg's (1994) paper in this issue. This section summarizes the research and theory 
progression. It is not surprising that this was an early research focus because anxiety–performance research has 
obvious practical appeal. Both researchers and practitioners are familiar with the stress of competition: We have 
seen athletes or students rise to the challenge, and we have seen others choke under stress. Also, psychology 
was a rich source of theories and empirical work related to anxiety–performance research. In late 1960s, sport 
psychology emerged as a research area by focusing on motor performance using lab tasks borrowed from motor 
behavior. So, much work focused on the effect of social influence (particularly anxiety-provoking conditions) 
on performance of motor tasks. 
 
The dominant models were drive theory, which purports that increased arousal/anxiety increases habit or 
dominant response performance, and the inverted-U hypothesis, which predicts that performance is best at a 
moderate optimal level and becomes progressively worse with either increases or decreases in arousal. Both 
theories were based on experimental psychology research and often on lab studies with animals. 
 
Sport psychologists adopted and tested these theories, and Martens and Landers (1970) published one of the key 
supporting studies for the inverted-U. Considerable work went into debating drive versus inverted-U. Inverted-
U won, perhaps as much because of its intuitive appeal as any research support. Drive theory did not really 
"lose," and continued to be cited in some work (e.g., audience effects on performance). Janet Spence (1971), 
who developed the Manifest Anxiety Scale used in much drive theory research, wrote an aptly titled defense, 
"What Can You Say About a Twenty-Year Old Theory That Won't Die?" in response to Martens's (1971) call 
for motor behavior researchers to abandon drive theory in favor of the inverted-U. Now, with drive theory over 
40, Spence seems willing to bury it, as she has moved to more cognitive and social approaches in her work. 
Moreover, Martens no longer promotes the inverted-U. 
 
Something is missing in both drive and inverted-U theories. Both miss the key element of a psychological 
perspective—thought or appraisal. Neither drive theory nor the inverted- U hypothesis includes a cognitive step, 
and neither is prominent in current stress work. Sport and exercise psychology has moved toward more social 
cognitive approaches, although we have not fully realized the implications of those approaches. 
 
Competitive Anxiety 
Anxiety continued as a dominant research theme in sport psychology, and as researchers moved away from 
testing the arousal—performance relationship, they adopted more cognitive approaches. In particular, 
Spielberger's (1966) work guided much work on competitive anxiety. In his early work, Spielberger (1966) 
separated trait and state anxiety. Trait anxiety is a characteristic that influences perceived threat (cognitive 
appraisal). Perceived threat then elicits state anxiety, which is the immediate state or response to stress (the fight 
or flight reaction and related responses). A high-trait-anxious person might see an upcoming tennis match as a 
threat and respond with high state anxiety, whereas another might perceive it as a challenge and remain 
relatively calm. 
 
Sport psychologists, particularly Martens, took Spielberger's basic model and developed sport-specific 
constructs and measures, and this was a major step forward for sport and exercise psychology. Rather than 
simply adopting psychology constructs and measures, researchers began to consider unique aspects of sport and 
exercise. Working from a conceptual model of competitive anxiety, Martens (1976) developed a sport-specific 
measure of trait anxiety, with the assumption that persons perceiving competitive sport as threatening and 
responding with state anxiety might not be the same people who respond to other potential threats (e.g., tests, 
speeches). Subsequent research confirmed that sport-specific measures were better predictors of competitive 
anxiety (for a review see Martens, 1976; Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990), and researchers now emphasize 
sport-specific constructs and approaches in much of their sport psychology work. 
 
Martens et al. (1990) later took a sport-specific approach to state anxiety. This work took another important 
advance by approaching anxiety as a multidimensional construct. Psychologists (e.g., Borkovec, 1976; 
Davidson & Schwartz, 1976; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Moms, Davidson, & Hutchings, 1981) had begun to 
emphasize multidimensional approaches, and the dominant distinction was between cognitive (worry) and 
somatic (physiological arousal) dimensions. These multidimensional approaches have expanded questions and 
methods, and also moved sport psychologists closer to the Lazarus model with its system of interrelated 
variables. For example, cognitive and somatic anxiety seem to have different antecedents (somatic seems a 
more automatic reaction, whereas cognitive is more dependent on appraisal), different relationships to 
performance or performance components, and different implications for practice (e.g., stress management) 
(Gould & Krane, 1992; Wrisberg, 1994). Recently, some sport psychologists have investigated the possibility 
that different anxiety components have different relationships to performance. For example, Burton (1988) and 
Martens et al. (1990) have suggested that somatic anxiety and performance follow the inverted-U, whereas 
cognitive worry and performance are negatively related. 
 
Landers and Boutcher (1993) recently reviewed the anxiety—performance literature and used a guiding model 
that resembles Lazarus's model. This model highlighted cognitive appraisal, and contained a multidimensional 
approach that extended beyond Martens's self- reported anxiety to incorporate psychophysiological measures. 
That opens up even more possibilities, as well as problems. It has been clear for some time that measures (even 
physiological measures) of anxiety are not highly correlated. Instead, anxiety responses seem to be idiosyncratic 
patterns. 
 
Rather than simply consider multiple dimensions separately, the most recent models have looked at interactions. 
For example, one simple interaction would be to suggest that if cognitive anxiety is positive (confidence, no 
worry), then somatic anxiety or physiological arousal has a positive relationship to performance, but if cognitive 
anxiety is negative (high worry), then somatic anxiety and performance are negatively related. Although this 
theory has not been proposed, reversal theory (proposed by Kerr, 1990), and Martens's (1987) discussion of 
psychic energy in his coaching psychology book, express similar views. 
 
One intriguing interactive model that has gained the attention of sport psychology researchers is catastrophe 
theory, which has been promoted by several sport psychologists in Great Britain (e.g., Hardy, 1990). This 
theory includes an interaction similar to the one just mentioned, but it is a much more complex model, involving 
three-dimensional, nonlinear relationships. Essentially, the relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance changes, depending on the level of physiological arousal; however, the relationships arc not 
simple, straight lines. Some of the more interesting features involve nonlinear relationships. Catastrophe theory 
suggests that as arousal increases, performance increases to a point (as in the inverted- U), but that as arousal 
gets beyond the optimal level, it does not simply decrease in a smooth curve, but drops abruptly as the athlete 
goes over the edge a catastrophe. Moreover, if the athlete who has gone over the edge tries to bring arousal 
under control and get back to an optimal level, it's not simply going back in the same path. Instead, the athlete 
must go back much further to lower arousal levels in order to get back on track and then gradually build up 
again. That seems reasonable as stated, but showing it on the model, and demonstrating it empirically, is a 
challenge, to say the least. Investigating the inverted-U was a major methodological problem, and catastrophe 
theory looks like a nightmare compared to the inverted-U. The mathematics are complex, and testing the 
relationships requires multiple, precise, consistent, and valid measures of both anxiety and performance. Such 
measures and procedures are not imminent in either psychology or sport and exercise science. 
 
Not only is the precision required to adequately test the model beyond our current methodologies, but the reality 
of anxiety–performance, at least at the level of interest for sport and exercise psychology, may not be nearly as 
precise as the model. Catastrophe theory is similar to the dynamical systems approach, and may be more 
applicable to other research questions (e.g., providing more precise motor control parameters or 
psychophysiological pattems over time) than to the more behavioral anxiety–performance relationship. 
Moreover, developing adequate methodologies to test catastrophe predictions could take us far from our real 
issues and behaviors of interest. Catastrophe theory is one research track, but one that is incredibly limiting in 
comparison to the broader implications of Lazarus's model. 
 
Exercise and Stress 
Most sport and exercise psychology work on stress focuses on anxiety–performance, but a few scholars in our 
field have investigated other aspects of stress. Usually these investigations move away from competitive sport 
to exercise. Also, these more recent lines of research often take their cues from the growing health psychology 
literature rather than from the experimental and social psychology models that guided anxiety–performance 
research. Many of these health psychology topics (e.g., adherence, stress management, coping) have obvious 
connections to sport and exercise. Also, health psychology, probably more than any other psychology area, uses 
a biopsychosocial model that could provide a nice parallel framework for sport and exercise psychology. 
 
Considerable health psychology work involves the stress–health link (e.g., relationships of stress to 
cardiovascular disease or immune function). You can think yourself sick, or think yourself well. For example, 
the recent Bill Moyers (1993) PBS series and book on healing and the mind shows the prominence and 
acceptance of this work within the medical and research communities. That work becomes relevant to sport and 
exercise science when we add physical activity to the equation—a triad of stress, health, and physical activity. 
 
Physical activity can fit into the model in several ways, and we have begun to investigate some of those links. 
One of the more active research lines is physical activity as a mediator between stress and health/illness. For 
example, do fit people have less stress response or recover more quickly? The early answer is "Yes," but the 
research is just beginning, and we know little about the processes, mechanisms, and variations involved in these 
relationships (e.g., Crews & Landers, 1987). We might consider physical activity as a coping mechanism in 
recovery and rehabilitation (e.g., activity with cancer or AIDS patients). Several people in sport and exercise 
science, as well as health psychology, have looked at the role of physical activity in mood, depression, or 
general psychological well-being (see Morgan & Goldston, 1987, for a review). Also, we should note that the 
role of physical activity in the stress—health relationship is not necessarily beneficial. Physical activity could 
negatively affect stress or health (for further information on these topics see Berger, 1994; Dishman, 1994). 
 
We can look at direct links between activity and stress, or activity and health, but our greatest contributions may 
come when we use a more encompassing stress model as a framework to consider the role of physical activity 
within the stress process. 
 
Application of Stress Models 
This concern for more encompassing models brings me to another way that sport psychology interfaces with 
stress research. We have adopted more encompassing stress models to provide a framework for some research 
and practice. 
 
First, we have used stress models in the area of stress management. Ron Smith (1980), who has worked with 
psychological stress models in his broader psychology work, applied a cognitive stress model to stress 
management for sport_ Specifically, Smith highlights cognitive appraisal as a key to the stress process. The 
model includes multiple interrelated variables, and the process moves over time. Extemal events may trigger 
stress, but the individual appraisal is the key. Similarly, the response is multidimensional, with physiological, 
psychological, and behavioral correlates and consequences. Smith developed a stress-management program 
with an integrated coping response, which involves both cognitive and behavioral strategies, as the key skill. 
With an integrated set of coping skills and possible strategies, the individual can then tailor coping responses to 
the situation and individual preferences. 
 
More recently, Smith (1986) has taken a similar approach and has adopted the stress model to fit the particular 
constructs and relationships 1hat are prominent for burnout. Similarly, Anderson and Williams (1988) applied 
the stress model to injury in sport. Again, injury is a stress process, highlighting cognitive appraisal in a 
multidimensional system, and the stress/ injury model provides a framework for both research and practice. 
 
The application of stress models in sport and exercise by Smith and others incorporates key features of 
Lazarus's model. These models highlight cognitive appraisal in a multidimensional system of interrelated 
psychobiological variables, and the complexity of the model highlights the importance of individualizing 
applications. Given the almost limitless possibilities, the stress process is different for every individual, even 
with the same situation. This is one of the most important practical implications of the stress research. The 
complexity of the model makes universal principles or predictions virtually impossible. Stress is an individual 
process; coping with stress is an individual process; and sport and exercise psychologists should focus on 
individual characteristics and preferences rather than applying universal strategies to all. 
 
Current Directions and Possibilities 
So, sport and exercise psychologists recognize some aspects of the model—cognitive appraisal, the interactive 
roles of person and environment, and the importance of individualization. However, our methodology has not 
kept up with these conceptual advances. Moreover, there are other aspects of Lazarus's model that we have not 
really recognized yet in our research models. We discuss the dynamic, recursive nature of the stress process, but 
we have not really dealt with it Research models generally assume one-dimensional predictions, and no method 
adequately probes the ongoing process over time. These are big research challenges; major design and 
methodological innovations are needed to examine the model. As Lazarus (1986, 1990) notes, we cannot 
decompose the model into parts to understand the relationships and processes. 
 
We recognize that stress is a psychobiological process. But, stress actually is a biopsychosocial process, and we 
are just beginning to incorporate the social aspect. The social aspect receives increasing attention in Lazarus's 
recent work. Everything takes place within a social context. Social context affects both person and environment 
and determines both sources of stress and appraisals of stress. For example, sources and perceptions of 
competitive stress and coping processes may be quite different for girl and boy soccer players. Social context 
further influences psychophysiological responses and consequences of stress, as well as coping processes. 
 
Social support has been investigated as a coping mechanism or buffer for stress, and sport psychologists (e.g, 
Rosenfeld, Richman, & Hardy, 1989) have begun to look at the role of social support in competitive athletics. 
We might consider stress management at a social level, similar to community interventions sometimes 
considered in health psychology. We might adapt community approaches to sport and exercise settings and 
consider team or group interventions and processes. 
 
Stress is an encompassing system, but Lazarus suggests that it is not encompassing enough. Stress and emotion 
are overlapping processes, and emotion is the more encompassing and richer term. Lazarus suggests that we 
could gain greater information by considering emotion. For example, we typically look at anxiety in 
competition. Individuals might also respond with hope, anger or sadness. If we consider the broader emotional 
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